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4.1  Introduction 
Historically, federal tax law  has allowed itemizers to deduct state 
and local property, income, and general sales taxes on their personal 
income tax returns. This provision is estimated to have decreased fed- 
eral tax revenues by  about $30.8 billion in  1985. (Executive Office of 
the  President  1986, G-42). The last  several years have witnessed  a 
serious public debate about the merits of partially or totally eliminating 
state and local tax deductibility. The U.S. Treasury recommended com- 
plete abolition of deductibility in 1984, as did President Reagan in 1985. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 disallowed state sales tax deductions, but 
continued those for income and property taxes. More changes in the 
tax code are likely in the next few years, and state and local tax de- 
ductibility is likely to remain a controversial issue. 
Those who favor deductibility argue that its elimination would have 
a disastrous impact on state and local public finance.2 In this view, if 
people cannot deduct state and local taxes on their federal tax returns, 
then state and local government goods and services in effect become 
more expensive, and the demand for them declines. State and local 
public officials appear to believe this scenario. When the United States 
Conference of Mayors convened in 1985, the New York Times reported 
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that the meeting “ended with an unusual display of bipartisan unanim- 
ity: only one ‘no’ vote was audible on a resolution urging Congress to 
amend the [president’s] tax plan to keep deductibility of state and local 
taxes  .lr3 
This very simple story about the impact of deductibility ignores the 
fact that subfederal governments have access to nondeductible sources 
of revenue,  such as user charges, license fees, special assessments, 
etc. It could be that eliminating deductibility would lead only to the 
substitution of nondeductible for deductible revenue sources, and have 
no impact on spending. However, econometric studies by Inman (1985), 
Hettich and Winer (1984), and Noto and Zimmerman (1984) find that 
a jurisdiction’s choice of revenue instruments is not responsive to its 
“tax price”: the effective cost of  a dollar of  expenditure taking into 
account federal deductibility. Recently, Feldstein and Metcalf (1986) 
challenged this result, arguing that these  studies employed  inappro- 
priate data, incorrect tax price measures, and/or inconsistent econo- 
metric techniques. Their examination  of  1980 data suggested that  if 
deductibility were removed (1) state and local use of deductible taxes 
would decline, (2) use of  other revenue sources would increase, and 
(3) net expenditures from local funds would stay about the same. More- 
over, because some of  the revenue sources that are nondeductible to 
individuals are deductible to businesses, eliminating deductibility on 
personal tax returns would not increase federal revenues as much as 
one would expect if  one ignored revenue instrument substitution ef- 
fects.  Indeed, federal tax collections  might  even decrease. Unfortu- 
nately, the regression coefficients which form the basis for all these 
conclusions are estimated imprecisely in the sense that the coefficients 
are small relative to their standard errors. 
At the moment, then, economists’ understanding  of the empirical 
impact of deductibility seems to be a bit murky. In this paper we present 
new evidence based on a rich set of data which tracks the fiscal behavior 
of  172 local governments from  1978 to 1980. Our goal is to find the 
effects of deductibility on the mix between deductible and nondeduc- 
tible revenue  sources, and on expenditures.  The use  of  panel  data 
allows us to control for the existence of “individual  effects”  in our 
equations for the various fiscal spending decisions, and hence to obtain 
more convincing estimates of the effects of  deductibility.  Our main 
findings are that (1) the elasticity of deductible taxes with respect to 
their tax price is in the range of -  1.2 to -  1.6; (2) the tax price has 
no statistically significant effect on the use of nondeductible revenue 
sources; and (3) the elasticity of local expenditures with respect to the 
tax price is about -  1.8. 
The estimating models are specified in  section 4.2. Section 4.3 de- 
scribes the  data.  Section 4.4  discusses  the  econometric issues and 
presents the results. Section 4.5 concludes with a summary. 109  Tax Deductibility  and Municipal Budget Structure 
4.2  The Model 
4.2.  I.  Preliminaries 
Analysis of the effects of deductibility on community  decision making 
is complicated by the fact that it leads to different voters having dif- 
ferent effective prices for local public spending. For a nonitemizer, the 
effective  price  of a dollar of  local  spending is just a dollar.  For  an 
itemizer, the effective price is one minus the marginal tax rate, and 
among itemizers, marginal tax rates differ across people.  Which tax 
price is relevant for understanding community decisions? 
One possible approach is to appeal to the median voter model, and 
argue that the median of the community’s tax prices is the relevant 
figure. However, the person with the median tax price is not necessarily 
the person with  the  median  demand for public  goods.  More funda- 
mentally,  the median voter model has a number of  well-known  defi- 
ciencies-it  ignores such potentially important effects on fiscal decisions 
as logrolling, coalition formation, and bureaucratic power. (See Inman 
forthcoming.) 
In the absence of a generally accepted model of community decision 
making to serve as a framework for our analysis, some sensible and 
convenient ad hoc formulation is required.  We  follow  Feldstein and 
Metcalf and assume that the community’s decision depends upon its 
average tax price. That is, if  the average marginal federal tax rate for 
itemizers is  T  and the proportion of itemizers is m,  then we assume 
that the price that is relevant for community  decision making is (1 -  m)  1 
-k  VZ(l -  T).4 
4.2.2  Estimating Equations 
The Basic Model 
Our goal is to estimate the impact of the tax price on a community’s 
deductible taxes per capita (TD), nondeductible own sources  of revenue 
per capita (TN),  and expenditures per capita, (E).  Earlier empirical work 
suggests that each of these variables will depend upon the community’s 
tax price (P),  family income (Y),  and other economic and demographic 
variables that might affect the community’s budget constraint and/or 
preferences (a k-dimensional vector X).  Employing the convenient con- 
stant elasticity specification, the estimating equation for (say) TD  is 
x 
(1)  lnTuit = a.  + a,  In  Pi, + a2  In  Yi, +  a2+I  X,,,  + J;.  + kjt, 
.i- I 
where i indexes communities, t indexes years, the a’s are parameters, 
pit  is a random error term, andA.is an “individual effect” for community 
i-a  composite of those characteristics of  the community that affect 
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“political  make-up,”  climate, etc.)5  Importantly, it is quite likely that 
J; is correlated with the right-hand-side variables, with the result that 
an OLS regression leads to inconsistent estimates of  the parameters. 
The equations for lnTNir  and In&  take the same form. 
In order to estimate equation (4.  I), take first differences in order to 
eliminate x.: 
(2)  lnTui, - In  TDjr-l  = al(lnPj, - lnPjr-l) 
k 
+ a,(lnYjr - InYjf-l)  + C a2+j(~jir  - xjj,-,) 
j=  I 
+ (Pit - ~it-1). 
Again, the equations for (In TNjr  - InTNj,-  and (In&  - In&  I)  take 
the same form. 
The first problem one faces in implementing this framework is con- 
struction  of  the average  tax price.  It would  clearly  be  desirable to 
compute P separately for each community on the basis of its taxable 
income.  However, data limitations make  it  difficult  to do this  in  a 
convincing way.6 Instead, we form P using data for the state in which 
the community  is located. Specifically, denote by  P;r the statewide 
average tax price of the state in which community i is located. Suppose 
that the discrepancy between Pfr and Pi, depends on the differences 
between the community’s values of certain variables and their state- 
wide counterparts. For example, if a community’s income exceeds state 
income, we  expect that its tax price  will  be  lower, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, a community  with  a  homeownership rate higher than the 
state average will have a lower tax price, ceteris paribus. Suppose that 
we denote all variables that affect the tax price in this way by an n- 
dimensional vector z.  Then we can write 
n 
Inp,  = lnp$ + C yj  (Zj, -  ZJjr)  + gj, 
j=  j  (3) 
where the superscript s  indicates a statewide value, and gj  is an indi- 
vidual effect. 
Recall now that our basic estimating equation is in first differences. 
Therefore, when (zjj, - 4,)  does not change much over time, its effect 
on the tax price  can be  ignored.  This is  likely  to be true of  most 
candidates for inclusion in  the z  vector.  For example, one does not 
expect the difference  between a  community’s proportion of  home- 
owners and the statewide average to change much from year to year. 
We assume that income is the only variable in the z vector for which 
the difference between state and community values might change sub- 
stantially over time.  Under this condition, taking first differences of 
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(4)  In P, - In Pit-, = (In Pfr - In  Pf,-J 
+ yI  x  [In Yi, - In  YfJ - (In  Yjf-l  - In  Yf,-Jl, 
where  Yff is per capita income in community i’s state during year t. 
Provided that the tax price goes down as income goes up, we expect 
yI  < 0. Substituting into equation (2) gives us 
(5)  In  T,,  - In  T,+,  = al(ln  Pff - In Pi,-,) + (a2  + aIyJ 
k 
x  (ln  Yir  - ln  Yit-1) + 2 az+j(xjit -  Xjir-1) 
j=  I 
- aly,(lnY/f  - lnl‘/f-l)  + (pjt - p-jf-l). 
The same logic can be applied to the estimating equations for (In TNir 
- In  TNjf-I)  and (In El - In 
In short, our use of the state tax price to “proxy” for the community 
tax price requires that we include state income on the right side of each 
equation. In doing so, notice that each of  the three equations--lnTD, 
InT,,  InE-incorporates  equation (4). As a result, the system of equa- 
tions is subject to a nonlinear constraint: the ratio of the coefficient on 
(the change in) state income to the coefficient on (the change in) the 
tax price is identical in all three equations. In the empirical work below, 
we test this constraint as a check on our specification of the estimating 
equations. 
Another issue related to Pi, is its possible endogeneity. Imagine that 
community  i has an unexpectedly high preference for using deductible 
sources of revenue, i.e., a positive kit.  This positive kjr  will be asso- 
ciated with a relatively high propensity to itemize in community  i, and, 
conditional on itemizing, with a relatively low federal marginal tax rate. 
Both of these tendencies will affect the value of Pi,. Hence, there is 
probably  some correlation  between Pi, and kir.  When estimating the 
parameters from a single cross section of data, this may be quite a 
serious problem. However, its severity is likely to be attenuated in an 
individual-effects model. This is because the presence ofh  in (1) better 
controls for the unobserved preferences determining the left-hand-side 
variables.  Still, some correlation  between  the price variable and the 
error term may remain, so we employ an instrumental  variables esti- 
mation technique, as described below. 
We  now turn to the variables in the X-vector. These include: 
SHARE = state government spending as a percentage of the state 
GRANTS = sum of federal and state grants, per capita 
ASSETS  =  per capita market value at the beginning of the fiscal 
year of holdings of federal securities, mortgages, bonds, cash, sinking 
funds, bond funds, etc. 
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DEBTS  = market value of outstanding long and short-term debt per 
POP = population 
capita 
The inclusion of most of these variables is routine, but a few require 
some comment. The presence of  the SHARE variable is in response 
to the fact that states differ in  the division of  taxing and expenditure 
decisions between states and communities.  SHARE is a simple way, 
suggested by Oates (1979, of  controlling for such institutional differ- 
ences. The ASSETS and DEBTS  variables  are present  to allow for 
intertemporal aspects of community decision making. Communities can 
finance current expenditures by drawing down their assets or by bor- 
rowing, even though these activities are sometimes subject to institu- 
tional constraints. 
Alternative Specijications. 
We  also consider a number of departures from the basic model. The 
purposes of analyzing these variants  are to assess the robustness of 
our results, and to facilitate comparisons with earlier work. 
First, we estimated a group of regressions leaving out the ASSETS, 
GRANTS, and DEBTS variables from the right-hand side. Feldstein 
and Metcalf excluded these variables from their models. Doing likewise 
can help us determine whether discrepancies between our substantive 
results and theirs depends on this difference in specification. 
A second set of variations is suggested by  the fact that most of the 
earlier work on the impact of deductibility on local public finance has 
used single cross sections rather than panel data. Our individual effects 
model analyzes the changes in budget structure in response to changes 
in the tax price. This corresponds more closely to the proposed policy 
intervention than cross-community variation. Nevertheless, it is inter- 
esting to compare the results when the same data are used to estimate 
both an individual effects model and a series of cross-sectional models. 
Of  course, in cross-sectional  models one must include slow changing 
factors that are differenced out of the individual effects specification. 
Accordingly, we augment the X  vector with a number of such variables: 
PUPILS = individuals aged 3 and older enrolled in school, per capita 
POOR = individuals below the poverty line, per capita 
OLD = individuals aged 65 and above, per capita 
OWN = proportion of occupied housing units that are owner occupied 
NONWHITE = proportion of population that is not white 
PCT810, PCTlOl5, PCT1525, PCT25 = proportion of families with 
incomes in the ranges $8,000-$9,999; $1 0,OOO-$14,999;  $ I5  ,000-$24,999; 
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4.2.3 
In all  the models we estimate, the observations are individual  lo- 
calities. In contrast, Feldstein and Metcalf employ state and local totals 
by  state.’  Thus, while  one of  our observations is  Bridgeport, Con- 
necticut, they would use the sum of all communities  in Connecticut 
plus the state government itself. Feldstein and Metcalf argue emphat- 
ically  that analyzing community  budgets is not a good way  to learn 
about the effects of deductibility. They note that the division of taxing 
and spending responsibilities between state and local governments var- 
ies enormously  among the states. Moreover,  some communities  are 
under institutional constraints with  respect  to the kind of tax instru- 
ments they can employ. Finally, they observe that it is virtually im- 
possible to get good tax price data on a community level. 
It seems to us that Feldstein and Metcalf overstate their case. To  be 
sure, some communities may be legally constrained in their choice of 
tax instruments, but within these constraints, there may be scope for 
choice between deductible and nondeductible revenue sources. In any 
case, to the extent that these constraints can be viewed as individual 
effects, our econometric procedure controls for them. Similarly, we 
can control at least crudely for across state differences in the state- 
local division of responsibilities by including our SHARE variable, the 
share of state expenditures in the state and local total. 
As noted above, we agree with Feldstein and Metcalf that the inability 
to compute a tax price for each community is a major problem. How- 
ever, their procedure does not really solve this problem; in effect they 
circumvent  it by assuming that the state and all localities make their 
decisions  on the basis of the statewide average tax price.  This does 
not seem too much different from our procedure of approximating the 
community tax price as the state tax price plus a correction factor. 
Lest this all sound too defensive, we should emphasize that there 
are several real advantages to using local data. First, communities and 
states do not act in concert to set state and local totals; rather,  the 
totals are the aggregate of each jurisdiction’s decisions. What one gets 
by  lumping all  communities together and then combining them with 
the state  government is unclear. In short, the underlying model purports 
to describe the behavior of decision-making units; these units are the 
jurisdictions themselves. A second advantage of using local data is that 
there are a lot of communities, and they differ substantially  in their 
fiscal  practices.  As an econometric matter,  greater sample  size and 
variation are aids to obtaining precise parameter estimates. 
We  conclude that neither type of data is obviously superior. They 
both have advantages and disadvantages. We  view analyses of the two 
types of data as complementary-each can shed light on the problem. 
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4.3  Data 
Our budgetary dataX  are drawn from the Census of  Governments for 
1977 and the Annual Survey of  Governments for 1976 and 1978-1980. 
A random sample of municipal governments was selected from the data 
tape for 1979 (the year with the least coverage), and these same gov- 
ernments were selected for the remaining years when po~sible.~  There 
was usable information on 172 municipal governments. 
In each year the record for each government contains information 
on revenues, expenditures, assets, debts, and grant receipts. Par values 
of  all outstanding debt and holdings of  financial assets are converted 
to market values using the indices provided by Eisner and Pieper (1984). 
Finally, budgetary variables are converted to real dollars using a region- 
specific CPI and then deflated to per capita terms. 
We  divide real per capita revenues into deductible taxes and non- 
deductible revenues. The former is composed of  (with means in  pa- 
rentheses) property taxes ($281.76), sales taxes ($12.62), and income 
taxes ($3.69). Clearly the property tax is dominant. Indeed, of the 172 
governments in the sample, only 39 used a general sales tax, 37 used 
a selective sales tax, and only 3 had an income tax.I0 Unfortunately, 
the census data do not allow us to distinguish between property taxes 
from residential  and nonresidential  sources; the implications of  this 
problem are discussed in  section 4.4 below. 
Nondeductible revenues are simply the difference between total rev- 
enues from own sources and deductible taxes. These revenues display 
considerable diversity in the sample, but all communities rely heavily 
on  taxes  and  charges for water  supply, utilities,  and  sewerage  and 
sanitation. The mean per capita value of nondeductible revenue sources 
was $187.28. 
As noted  above, each community's  tax  price  is  assumed to be  a 
function  of  the tax  price of its  state. The latter is calculated  in  the 
following fashion. For each state in every year under consideration, 
the average taxable income per itemized return is computed from the 
IRS's Statistics of  Income and the corresponding marginal federal in- 
come tax rate (7)  determined. In addition, the proportion (m)  of item- 
ized returns for each state is calculated. The state's tax price, P", is 
then P"  = (I -  rn) + rn(l -  7).  'I 
Population characteristics  such as the proportion of homeowners, 
proportion below the poverty line, etc., are taken from the County and 
City Data Book for 1983, which contains data for 1980. Because these 
variables change relatively slowly, we use the 1980 values in the cross- 
sectional regressions for  1978 and  1979 as well.  In some cases, data 
for a municipality were not available from the County and City Data 115  Tax  Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure 
Book. In these cases, data for the county in which the municipality is 
located are used. 
The final data issue is the measurement of income.  Yearly  obser- 
vations, needed to complete the panel data set, are not available from 
census sources. Instead, we use median family “effective  buying in- 
come” taken from Safes Management  magazine as published  in  the 
annual Survey ofBuying Power. In effect, this variable is the predicted 
value of a hedonic disposable income equation based on the charac- 
teristics of the area. Data on the income distribution within each com- 
munity are taken from the same source. Because “effective  buying 
income” is a disposable income concept, it does not conform exactly 
to the census measure of income used by Feldstein and Metcalf. None- 
theless, it is quite similar. For 1980 (when both are available), the simple 
correlation between this measure and census median family income is 
0.828; the correlation with census per capita income is 0.772. 
Table 4.1  lists the means of each variable for 1980. The figures in- 
dicate that our communities  relied  more  on deductible  than nonde- 
ductible forms of revenue; the difference between the means of InT, 
Table 4.1  Means of Variables in 1980 
In  TI, 
In  TN 
In E 
In  P‘ 
In GRANTS 
In  Y 
In ASSETS 
In  DEBT 

















































Note: Standard deviations of  each variable are in parentheses. 116  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
and lnT,  was 0.507. The other general feature worth noting is the large 
amount of across community variation. The standard deviations of the 
logarithms imply large variations in the levels. 
Table 4.2 shows the means of the first differences of  the variables 
during 1978-1980.  During this period, in real terms collections of de- 
ductible taxes per capita fell by about 4.7 percent annually, while non- 
deductible revenue sources increased by about 1.7 percent a year. Real 
expenditures per capita fell about 1.8 percent annually. Note, however, 
the relatively large standard deviations. As in the case of the figures 
reported  in  Table 4.1, there is substantial variability across jurisdic- 
tions, so one must be cautious in thinking about the mean values as 
being “typical.” 
Table 4.2  Means of the First Differences, 1978-l98Os 
InTD, - InTnr-,  -  0.0473 
(0.130) 
InTN, - InTN,_,  0.0165 
(0.281) 
InE, - InE,-,  -0.0181 
(0.164) 






InGRANTS, - InCRANTS,-,  -  0.0286 
InY, - InY,-,  -0.0156 
InASSETS, - InASSETS,. I  -0.0710 
InDEBT, - InDEBT,+,  -0.105 
SHARE, - SHARE,-,  1.131 
( 1.792) 
(0.04229) 
InPOP, - InPOP,. I  0.00068 
“Standard deviations of  each variable are in parentheses. 
4.4  Estimating the Model 
4.4.1  Econometric Issues 
There are several general issues in estimation. First is the potential 
endogeneity of  the tax price. As noted above, there are good reasons 
to believe that  in  a  cross-sectional regression  the  tax  price  will  be 
correlated with the error term. Similarly, it has long been recognized 
that grant receipts are endogenously determined. In the individual ef- 
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is likely to be less pronounced because one controls for the potential 
presence of  unobserved taste differences. Still, such a correlation re- 
mains a possibility, and we therefore use lagged values of the changes 
in the tax price and grants as instrumental variables. Note that although 
we start out with five years of data, one is used up because of differ- 
encing, and another because lagged variables are used as instrumental 
variables.  Hence, our estimates are based on three years, or equiva- 
lently, two first differences. 
A  second econometric issue is that the error terms may be heter- 
oskedastic. To  check this, in each case we  compute White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity  test.  In no  case is there  even weak  evidence of 
heteroskedasticity. As pointed out in  White (1982), this test is biased 
toward rejection of homoskedasticity in the instrumental variables con- 
text, so the failure to reject is even more striking. 
A final issue is a measurement problem associated with the dependent 
variable  in the deductible taxes equation.  Only residential  property 
taxes are deductible on personal tax returns, and, hence, belong in  T,. 
As noted  above, the census data used  do not  permit  us to identify 
residential versus nonresidential property taxes. To  gauge the impact 
of this, notice that the log of residential property taxes (TR)  is related 
to the log of total property taxes (Tp)  by the identity: lnTKi, = In+;,  + 
InT,,,,  where +if  is the ratio of residential to total property taxes. Viewed 
in  this way, and ignoring income and sales taxes,I2 the error term in 
our equation for T,,  contains the component In+;,. 
If +;,  is time invariant, no problem arises. However,  +if  may fall as 
the tax price rises. This will induce a positive correlation between the 
tax price and the error term. Other things equal, this will bias upward 
(toward zero) the estimated coefficient on the tax price. l3 Moreover, 
the standard errors of  our coefficients will  be larger than they would 
have been in the absence of this measurement problem. In short, our 
coefficient will  understate the importance of the tax price, both quan- 
titatively and from the point of view of  statistical significance. In the 
same way, the coefficient on the tax price  in  the equation for non- 
deductible revenues will  be biased downward toward zero. 
4.4.2  Results 
The estimates of the basic model, equation (I.S), are in  Table 4.3. 
From the coefficient of (In P; -  InPip- ,) in column (I), the elasticity of 
deductible taxes with  respect  to the tax price  is about -  1.55. This 
elasticity is quite precisely estimated; the coefficient exceeds its stan- 
dard error by  a factor of  about 3.1.  In this context it is important to 
emphasize that the first differences specification provides a very strin- 
gent test of  the importance of  deductibility because it focuses on the 
effect of changes in the tax price on chunges in deductible taxes. The 118  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
Table 4.3  Individual Effects Model: Basic Results. 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
InTD,  - InTD,_l  InTN, - InTN,_I  InE, - InE,+I 
Intercept  -  0.0940  -0.0324  -  0.0522 
(0.0  125)  (0.0330)  (0.0171) 
-  1.553  -  0.787  -  1.833 
(0.490)  (1.291)  (0.669) 
InY, - InY,-,  0.00142  -  0.495  0.154 
(0.233)  (0.613)  (0.3 18) 
InCRANTS, - InGRANTS,-I  -0.0185  0.0646  0.0889 
(0.0613)  (0.161)  (0.0837) 
(0.01 18)  (0.0310)  (0.0  161) 
(0.0284)  (0.0747)  (0.0388) 
(0.00483)  (0.0  1 27)  (0.00659) 
InASSETS, - InASSETSl_  I  -  0.00787  0.000794  -0.00234 
InDEBT, - InDEBT,-,  -  0.00362  0.0274  -0.0890 
SHARE, - SHARE,-l  -  0.00345  0.00820  -  0.00659 
InPOP, - InPOP,+,  -0.759  -0.808  -0.988 
(0.155)  (0.407)  (0.211) 
-  1.26  -1.16  -  1.649 
(0.410)  (I  .080)  (0.560) 
aEstimation is by instrumental variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
fact that the coefficient from the first differences specification is sig- 
nificant at conventional levels  seems strong evidence that  an effect 
really is present. 
From the second column in Table 4.3, the elasticity of nondeductible 
revenues with respect to the tax price is -0.787,  but it is imprecisely 
estimated. This is similar to Feldstein and Metcalf’s finding that one 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the tax price has no effect on the use 
of nondeductible revenue sources. 
The coefficient on the tax price variable in the third column of the 
table suggests that the impact of deductibility on local expenditures is 
substantial. The elasticity with respect to the tax price is -  1.83, and 
the coefficient exceeds its standard error by a factor of 2.7. This figure 
is considerably larger than most estimates of individual price elasticities 
of demand for public goods and services. However, as Feldstein and 
Metcalf emphasize, it is quite possible that the aggregate response to 
a change in  the tax price will exceed the individual response.  This 
follows directly from the fact that any given percentage change in an 
itemizer’s tax price produces a much smaller percentage change in the 
community tax price. For any observed variation in expenditure, the 
elasticity computed with respect to the community tax price will exceed 
that computed with respect to the itemizer’s tax price. 119  Tax Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure 
Most of the other coefficients in the table are imprecisely estimated. 
One interesting finding is that increases in population are associated 
with statistically significant decreases in  per capita expenditures and 
per capita collections of  both deductible and nondeductible  revenue 
sources. One possible explanation is the existence of  scale economies 
in  the provision of public goods and services. Another possibility is 
that this effect is due to sluggish adjustment to population  changes. 
That is, when population increases, communities are slow to change 
their behavior, so per capita magnitudes fall. To examine the second 
possibility, we estimated a simple stock adjustment version of equation 
(1 3.  This amounts to including the lagged dependent variable (DEP,-  ,) 
in each of the equations in Table 4.3. These results, which are reported 
in Table 4.4, suggest that one cannot reject  the hypothesis that  the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is zero. Thus, slow ad- 
justment does not appear to be a major factor in our data. Moreover, 
in each equation inclusion of the lagged dependent variable leaves the 
other coefficients basically unchanged. While we do not interpret these 
results as “proof”  that past decisions have no effect on current tax 
and expenditure patterns, they do indicate that allowing for dynamics, 
Table 4.4  Individual Effects Model With Slow Adjustments 
Intercept 
InP: - InP:_l 
InY, - InY,-l 
InCRANTS, - InGRANTS,  I 
InASSETS, - I~ASSETS,-I 
InDEET, - InDEBT,-I 
SHARE, - SHARE,-I 
InPOP, - InPOP,-, 
InY; - InY;.I 
DEPI- I 
-0.0916 






-  0.0073 I 
(0.0121) 
-  0.00278 
(0.0291) 
-  0.00350 
(0.00494) 
-  0.763 




-  0.0233 
-  1.261 
-0.0420 









(0.02  18) 
-  0.442 

















-  0.0889 
(0.0395) 








-  1.649 
“Estimation is by instrumental variables.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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at least in a simple way, appears to have no impact on our results about 
the effects of deductibility.I4 
As noted above, the use of equation (1.4) imposes a constraint across 
equations of our model; namely, that the ratio of the coefficient on the 
state income variable to the coefficient on the tax price variable should 
be identical in each of the equations. This ratio is our estimate of  -yI. 
Imposing this constraint on the estimated coefficients does not alter 
any of the qualitative results of the model. A test of the null hypothesis 
that the data satisfy the constraint yields a statistic of 0.158 which is 
distributed as a chi square with  2 degrees of freedom. The null  hy- 
pothesis is not rejected at conventional levels of significance.  Is Further, 
the estimated value of yI is -  .972 (with a standard error of .286). Thus, 
as expected, the community tax price falls relative to the state tax price 
as community income rises relative to state income.I6 
In our next set of  experiments, we deleted ASSETS, DEBTS, and 
GRANTS from the set of right-hand-side variables. As mentioned ear- 
lier, although we think that a good case can be made for including these 
variables, they were omitted from Feldstein and Metcalf’s  specifica- 
tion, hence, it is interesting to see whether their omission induces any 
substantive changes. Note that because grants are excluded from con- 
sideration, it makes sense for the dependent variable in  the “expen- 
ditures” equation to be expenditures from own sources only. In terms 
of our notation, the appropriate variable is In(T,,+ TN)  rather than InE. 
The results are reported in Table 4.5. A comparison with Table 4.3 
indicates that all  of  the substantive results are basically unchanged. 
Thus, while  we  prefer  the  specification  in Table 4.3 on  theoretical 
grounds, use of the Feldstein-Metcalf set-up does not affect our con- 
Table 4.5  Omitting GRANTS, ASSETS and DEBTS from the X-VeetoP 
Intercept  -0.0922 
InP, - InP,-,  -  1.525 
(0.0  107) 
(0.457) 
(0.224) 
InY, - InY,.I  -0.0328 
SHARE, - SHARE,_,  -  0.00298 
(0.00469) 
POP, -  POP,-,  -  0.746 
(0.151) 





(I  ,210) 





-  0.785 
-  1.142 
(1.062) 
-  0 .09  1 2 
(0.0  140) 
-  1.724 
(0.598) 
-  0.706 
(0.292) 
0.00384 




-  0.583 
“Estimation is by instrumental variables.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 121  Tax Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure 
clusions. In particular, we still find no evidence that a higher tax price 
leads to greater reliance on nondeductible sources of revenue. 
Our last set of  results consists of the basic specification estimated 
for individual cross sections. As emphasized above, we think the in- 
dividual effects model is more suitable. It is therefore of some interest 
to see how the  results  would  have differed if  we  had  used  a cross 
section instead. 
The cross-sectional results for 1980 are reported in Table 4.6. From 
the first column, we see that contrary to what one would expect, in- 
creases in the tax price increase the reliance on deductible sources of 
revenue. However, this coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Moreover, 
from the second column, increases in the tax price decrease reliance 
on nondeductible revenue sources by  a huge amount (the elasticity is 
minus 15), and this coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
What accounts for these peculiar results? One possibility is that the 
year 1980 was atypical for the communities in our sample. We  therefore 
estimated the cross-sectional equations for the years  1978 and 1979 as 
well.  The results  are reported  in  the  top  portion  of  Table 4.7. (To 
conserve space, we report only the coefficients on the tax price and 
income coefficients.) A glance at the figures in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 sug- 
gests that  the point estimates vary  considerably from  year  to  year. 
Indeed, the elasticities of E with respect to Ps flip signs from year to 
year. 
Thus, we cannot “blame” the implausible results of Table 4.6 on the 
choice of  year. An  alternative possibility  is  that  the cross-sectional 
equations are estimated with inappropriate instruments. The estimates 
presented so far use lagged tax price as an instrument. If: (a)  the primary 
source of  endogeneity in  the cross section arises from the fact that 
unobserved tastes for spending induce correlation between P,  and the 
error term, and (b) these unobserved taste differences persist over time; 
then lagged price will do little to purge the correlation between Pi,  and 
the error term. 
Fortunately, for the year  1980 we have available an alternative set 
of  instrumental  variables suggested by  Feldstein and Metcalf. These 
are (1) the proportion of taxpayers in the state who would be expected 
to itemize if  each taxpayer’s probability of itemizing were equal to the 
national  average for his  or her adjusted gross income class; (2) the 
marginal tax rate on thejrst dollar of  state and local tax deductions; 
and (3) the average tax rate on state and local tax deductions. These 
variables are expected to be correlated  with the state tax price, but 
uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. (See Feldstein and 
Metcalf [I9861 for further details.) The estimates that are obtained with 
this alternative set of instrumental variables are reported at the bottom 
of Table 4.7. A comparison of those elasticities with those reported in 122  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
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-  1.316 
-0.0228 








-  15.16 
(7.62) 




























-  0.477 
(0.0770) 
-  5.002 



































-  0.0556 
-0.518 
“Estimation is by instrumental variables. Numbers in  parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 4.6  indicates that the “wrong” signs are still present. We conclude 
that the use of  single cross sections to estimate the fiscal response of 
communities to changes in their economic environments can produce 
quite misleading results. 
Nevertheless, we think that cross-sectional data may help shed some 
light on a measurement problem that was discussed above. Namely, 123  Tax Deductibility  and Municipal Budget Structure 
Table 4.7  Additional Cross-Sectional  Results 
(2) 
In  TN 
(3) 
In  E 
I978 
InP‘  ~  11.76  -0.0334  -4.138 
(4.452)  (7.817)  2.655 
In Y  2.172  -5.707  0.  I98 
(I  351)  (3.251)  (0.104) 
1979 
InP‘  3.053  -21.90  -4.393 
(3.660)  (7.530)  (2.678) 
In  Y  1.491  -5.550  -  1.105 
(I S4l)  (3.172)  (I.  128) 
1980“ 
InP‘  7.898  -  8.750  3.289 
(3.356)  (6.2  17)  (2.140) 
In  Y  I. I92  -  6.764  -  2.691 
(1.361)  (2.520)  (0.867) 
Note: Estimation is  by instrumental  variables.  Numbers in  parentheses  are standard 
errors. 
“Feldstein and Metcalf’s instruments. 
our property tax data include payments from both residential and non- 
residential sources, which in theory can bias toward zero the tax price 
coefficients in the TD  and TN  equations. For a subset of  our commu- 
nities, we obtained  1980 data on the proportion of the property tax 
base that was residential. (Such data were not available for other years). 
Assuming that residents paid property taxes in proportion to their share 
in the tax base, we were able to estimate residential and nonresidential 
property taxes paid. For this subsample, the cross-sectional equations 
for TN  and TD  were then estimated both with and without nonresidential 
property taxes included in the respective left-hand-side variables. The 
results with and without the adjustment were essentially the same for 
both the  TI.,  and  TN  equations. This suggests that in  our sample, the 
share of nonresidential property taxes is sufficiently small that only an 
inconsequential bias is induced by lumping residential and nonresiden- 
tial property taxes together. Of course, we recognize the tenuous nature 
of this exercise. It is no substitute for an analysis of longitudinal data 
with information on the mix of  property tax receipts. 
4.5  Conclusion 
We  have examined fiscal data on  172 communities over the period 
1978 to 1980 in  order to estimate the effects of deductibility on local 
taxing and spending behavior. From a methodological point of view, 124  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
our first main result is that local data provide a fruitful source of in- 
formation on the impact of deductibility on fiscal decisions. Difficulties 
in defining tax  prices  and accounting for differences  in  institutional 
structures across states do not seem to prevent us from obtaining sen- 
sible and useful results. The second methodological result is that pa- 
rameters estimated from a single cross section of  fiscal data must be 
interpreted with care. Such parameters may depend upon the particular 
year chosen, and may be inconsistent because of the failure to account 
for individual effects. 
Our main substantive findings are: 
I. Deductibility does affect the choice of revenue sources. The elas- 
ticity of  deductible taxes with respect to the tax price is in the range 
-  1.2 to -  1.6. In our sample, the mean value of  the logarithm of the 
tax  price in  1980 was  -0.1  10. Thus, if  deductibility  were removed, 
i.e., if  In  P  became zero, then collections of deductible taxes would 
fall by more than  13 percent. 
2. However, we have not been able to find any evidence that removing 
deductibility would increase reliance on nondeductible  sources of fi- 
nance. Indeed, the point estimates of  these elasticities are negative, 
although they are imprecisely estimated. Thus, there is no reason to 
think that tax  substitutions at the local level would  mitigate against 
increased federal tax revenues if deductibility were removed. 
3. Local  spending is quite responsive  to changes in the tax price, 
with an elasticity of  about -  1.8. Thus, removing deductibility could 
have major effects on local spending. 
Notes 
1. See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984)  and President’s Tax Proposals 
to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity  (1985). 
2. There are also claims that removing deductibility would lead to an unfair 
increase in the tax burden on middle class taxpayers. The distributional im- 
plications of deductibility, both across states and across income classes, are 
discussed in Feenberg and Rosen (1986) and Kenyon (1986). 
3. “What Happens if Washington Changes the Rules?” New  York Times, 23 
June 1985, E5. 
4. As Fisher (1986) has noted, another factor that might affect the tax price 
is the fact that some state income taxes allow credits and deductions for local 
property tax  payments. To  examine this possibility, we computed the state 
income tax liability of a household that had the average taxable income on all 
itemized returns in its state. In every case, if  this household paid the average 
property tax in its community, then the credit or deduction had no marginal 
effect on the tax price of local spending. This is because the credits and de- 125  Tax Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure 
ductions are capped at a sufficiently low level that the household  with  the 
average property tax is  not affected on the margin. 
5. Note that equation  (I.  1) ignores differences in the (quality-adjusted) re- 
source cost of public sector inputs across communities. Implicitly, this assumes 
a national market for such inputs. Alternatively, input costs may vary across 
communities,  but  if  they do not change over time, they are included in the 
individual effect. Holtz-Eakin (1986) tests for the presence of individual effects 
in these data and finds that they are present. In addition, this specification does 
not allow for year effects. In some preliminary experiments we included year 
effects, and found that they did not change any of the substantive results. 
6. Inman (1985) provides an interesting attempt along these lines. 
7. Hettich and Winer (1984) employ state data without including figures from 
localities in the totals. 
8. A  more complete description of the data set from which this sample is 
drawn is contained in Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1985). 
9. To  remain  in  the sample, communities had  to report  positive  school 
expenditures. 
10. The econometric results below are unchanged when income and sales 
taxes are excluded in the computation of deductible taxes. 
11. This procedure differs  substantially from that  used  by  Feldstein and 
Metcalf, who took advantage of data from individual tax returns. Nevertheless, 
the two methods yield  quite similar results.  In  1980,  Feldstein  and Metcalf 
calculate the mean  tax price as 0.92 with a standard deviation of 0.02; the 
range is from 0.87 to 0.96. In comparison, our statewide tax prices for 1980 
have an average value of 0.90, a standard deviation of 0.03, a minimum of 0.86, 
and a maximum of 0.94. 
12. Allowing for income and sales taxes would introduce some nonlinearity 
into the problem, but not change the qualitative results. 
13.  Of course, a general analysis of the bias requires consideration  of the 
complete set of covariances among the right-side variables and the vector of 
covariances between  each of  these variables and +,,. We  think  that in  this 
particular case, these other covariances are unlikely to change our conclusion. 
14. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1985) discuss dynamic aspects of local 
government taxing and spending behavior. 
15. The test is computed by estimating the three equations as a system using 
three-stage least squares both with and without imposing the constraint. The 
covariance matrix from the unconstrained  estimation is  used  in  both cases. 
The test statistic is the difference between the constrained and unconstrained 
weighted sum of squared errors for the system. 
16. With an estimate of y,, one can use equation  (1.5) to work backward 
coefficients on In(P:,  - /nP;f-l)  and (InY,, - InY,,-I)  to solve for a?,  the effect 
of community income on the left-hand-side variable. In the expenditures equa- 
tion, this turns out to be negative, a result counter to a number of previous 
studies. However, the estimate is statistically insignificant. We conjecture that 
mismeasurement of the income variable may be the cause of this result. 
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Comment  Ronald C. Fisher 
Although economists have carefully examined, during the past 25 years, 
the effects of  intergovernmental  grant  incentives  on state and  local 
government  fiscal  behavior,  the effects  of  intergovernmental  tax in- 
centives on both the amount of spending and the choice of the revenue 
structure were largely ignored until very recently. [Notable exceptions 
are Inman (1971) and McLure (1967).] In the past four years, however, 
a  substantial  number of  both  theoretical  and empirical papers have 
appeared which explicitly consider the effect of tax incentives provided 
by the national and state governments on the expenditure and revenue 
decisions of all subnational governments. Indeed, this conference is 
evidence of that trend as four of the eight papers presented deal directly 
with the effects of intergovernmental tax incentives. 
Although this change perhaps reflects an increased awareness of and 
interest  in  the economics of the subnational government sector, the 
fact remains that the primary motivating factor for the new interest in 
tax incentives was a national government policy issue, reform of the 
federal  individual  income  tax and  the appropriate treatment of  the 
deduction for state and local taxes. Tax incentives are largely unim- 
portant for national government taxes (although federal income taxes 
are deductible against state income taxes in  16 states), and the over- 
whelming dominance of  income taxes at the national level effectively 
reduces interest in questions about the choice among alternative rev- 
enue instruments. Even the voluminous intergovernmental  grant lit- 
erature, while providing  insight to the fiscal behavior of subnational 
governments, has often been focused on the appropriate structure of 
grants from the viewpoint of the national government. 
Despite the origins of these new  research interests, the inevitable 
result is likely to be increased attention to the fiscal policy of subna- 
tional governments for its own sake and not just as it relates to national 
economic policy  decisions.  This is an important change in direction 
for both practical and academic reasons. Subnational government ex- 
penditures from own-sources in the United  States account for more 
than 10 percent of gross national product. And the substantial economic 
and fiscal diversity among subnational governments simply provides 
an  opportunity for examining issues of economic behavior which cannot 
be considered by focusing on the national government (except through 
international comparisons, where the institutional and data problems 
are even more severe than in the world of state and local governments). 
For instance, the diversification of state and local government revenues 
Ronald C. Fisher is professor of economics at Michigan State University. 128  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
among alternative sources is largely the factor that makes analysis of 
tax incentives both interesting and possible. 
Recent Analyses of Tax Incentives 
A common issue in the intergovernmental grant literature is the in- 
fluence  of grants, through  income and price effects, on the level of 
recipient  subnational  government spending in  the aggregate and for 
specific functions. In a few cases, consideration  is also given to the 
influence of grants on the revenue structure of the recipient govern- 
ments, such as the incentive in the U.S. general revenue-sharing for- 
mula for tax as opposed to user-charge financing, and for state income 
taxes in particular.  Tax  incentives, including federal income tax de- 
ductions for subnational taxes as well as state income tax deductions 
and credits for local government taxes, were first incorporated into the 
grant models as an additional factor affecting the tax price for subna- 
tional government services. The issue is whether tax incentives influ- 
ence the level and type of government spending.  But because these 
tax incentives are often not neutral among alternative revenue sources, 
the most recent research considers the effect of the incentives on the 
mix, as well as level, of subnational government taxes. 
This recent research includes work by  Hettich and Winer (1984), 
Kenyon (forthcoming), and Gade (1987) examining the revenue deci- 
sions of state governments; a paper by  Feldstein and Metcalf (1986) 
which considers the revenue decisions of state and local governments 
combined; and work by Inman (1979 and 1985), Gramlich (1985), Bell 
and Bowman (1987) and Fisher (1986) about the influence of tax in- 
centives on the fiscal decisions of individual local governments. 
The paper by Holtz-Eakin and Rosen fits in this last group.  They 
provide a careful examination of the effect of federal income tax de- 
ductibility on the amount of  spending and  the use  of  deductible as 
opposed to nondeductible revenue sources to finance that spending for 
a set of  municipal  governments. Holtz-Eakin  and  Rosen’s conclu- 
sions-that  deductible taxes and expenditures are increased by federal 
tax deductibility-are  generally consistent with the results of the other 
studies of local fiscal decisions, particularly considering the degree of 
disaggregation of the revenue options. What particularly distinguishes 
the Holtz-Eakin and Rosen work, however, is the clever, and appar- 
ently  important,  advances in  the  method for  estimating  tax  price 
elasticities. 
There are at least two major innovations in this work by Holtz-Eakin 
and Rosen compared to these other papers. First, by using panel data 
for 172 municipal governments over the years 1975 to  1980, they es- 
timate the effects of deductibility with difference equations, effectively 
comparing changes in  revenue amounts to the change  in  tax prices 129  Tax Deductibility and Municipal Budget Structure 
caused  by  deductibility.  This  method  corrects  for  unobservable 
community-specific factors that can influence these decisions and that 
apparently can be important, as Holtz-Eakin argues elsewhere (Na- 
tional Tax Journal, 1986). They also demonstrate that estimation using 
first-differences can give substantially different results than estimation 
from cross-sectional analysis using the same data. 
Second, because tax prices net of federal deductions cannot be mea- 
sured directly for these municipalities, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen estimate 
those local tax prices based on the weighted-average marginal tax price 
for the state in  which the city is located adjusted for the difference 
between the per capita income in  the locality and the state. The pre- 
sumption is that as the income of  a locality rises above that of the 
state, the tax price falls below that for the state. Taking first differences, 
this is represented by their equation (4). 
In  P,, - In  P,,-  I  = (In Ps,, - In  Ps,, ,) + yl x  [(In Y,, 
- In  Yy,,)  - (In Y,,-l - In F,,-,)l, 
where P is price, Y is per capita income, i represents the municipality, 
s represents  municipality  i’s state, and t  is  year.  If  there are other 
variables which influence tax prices, the assumption is that the differ- 
ence between the state and local values is stable over time (and thus 
eliminated by  the differencing). 
Holtz-Eakin and Rosen estimate first differences of constant elastic- 
ity equations for per capita deductible taxes (property, income, sales), 
nondeductible taxes, and expenditures as a function of tax price (mea- 
sured as above), per capita family income, grants, the state government 
share of spending, per capita assets, per capita debt outstanding, and 
population.  They report that per capita deductible taxes and expen- 
ditures of these municipalities are significantly negatively related to tax 
prices,  but  that there  appears to be  no  substitutability between de- 
ductible and nondeductible taxes. These results are generally consistent 
with those in the other papers examining local governments, with the 
exception of Inman’s 1985 paper. 
Evaluation of the Holtz-Eakin and Rosen Approach 
My comments about the approach taken by Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 
fall into two groups, those concerning the approximation of tax burden 
prices  for localities based  on the corresponding state tax price and 
those about the overall structure of the model. 
Local Tax Burden Prices 
Measuring Local Tax Burden Prices by State Tax Prices. Theoretically, 
Holtz-Eakin and Rosen’s assertion that differences between the state 130  Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen 
and  local  tax  prices  net  of  deductibility  depend  on  the differences 
between  the community’s values for a vector of  variables and their 
state counterparts seems clear. But as implemented, the assumption is 
that changes in local tax prices over time relative to changes in  the 
state prices can be reflected solely by changes in the difference between 
local and state per capita incomes. And that assumption is based on 
the notion that there is a significant relationship between the difference 
between state and local tax prices and the difference between state and 
local per capita incomes in any one year. The tax price net of deduct- 
ibility depends both on taxpayers’ federal marginal tax rates and on 
the fraction of  taxpayers who  itemize  federal deductions.  There is 
evidence suggesting that the correlation between income and itemizing 
at a given time is tenuous. 
In a survey of research on tax incentives, Kenyon (forthcoming, 29) 
notes that among states with effectively identical per capita incomes, 
there can be wide differences in the percentage of taxpayers who item- 
ize federal income tax deductions. The survey data reported and used 
by Gramlich (1985) suggest that even among localities in the same state, 
the probability of itemizing is not explained well by income alone. The 
average family income and percentage of voters who itemize for various 
sets of localities in Michigan in the Gramlich study are shown in table 
C4.1. Comparing both the city of  Detroit  to the city of  Lansing and 
the Detroit suburbs to the Lansing suburbs, the percentage of itemizing 
voters is substantially greater for the Detroit area despite the fact that 
average family incomes  are higher  in  the  Lansing  area.  One  likely 
explanation for the difference between those areas is that renting rather 
than owning housing is relatively more common in the Lansing area 
than in the Detroit area. The opposite pattern, the one hypothesized 
by Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, applies however for the “rural” and “other 
urban” counties. 
Table C4.1  Itemizing Behavior and Community Income in Michigan: Results 
From Gramlich, 1985 
Jurisdiction 
~  ~~ 
Average  Percentage of  Voters 
Family Income  Who Itemize Deductions 
Detroit  $12,556 
Lansing  15,371 
Rural counties  16,292 
Other urban counties  17,221 
Total sample  17,544 
Detroit Suburbs  2 I ,574 
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But because Holtz-Eakin and Rosen use first differences, if the fac- 
tors other than income which influence itemizing and tax prices (such 
as housing type) are relatively stable over time, then changes in local 
tax prices relative to the state may be captured entirely by changes in 
local income relative to the state. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen do assume 
that those other factors, the Zit’s  in their notation, are stable. But in 
estimating the tax and expenditure functions, the authors assume that 
there  are economic and demographic  variables  affecting the budget 
constraint and/or preferences, the Xit’s,  which are changing. There is 
something of  an internal inconsistency here if  one expects that some 
of the factors affecting the level of taxes and expenditures also influence 
the difference between state and local tax prices. In addition, the in- 
come data used are hedonic estimates based on changes in some char- 
acteristics of the community. Without changes in those characteristics 
over time, there can be no income changes over time. 
How well their method works is an empirical question and a difficult 
one to test because of the absence of local tax prices to begin with. 
One possibility is to evaluate how well the method works for estimating 
state tax prices by using the national average tax price and changes in 
the difference between state and national per capita incomes. Because 
I did not have average marginal federal income tax rates by state avail- 
able, I estimated Holtz-Eakin and Rosen’s equation (4) using the per- 
centage of taxpayers who itemize returns for 1983 and  1984 in  each 
state and nationally as the measure of  tax price. The result is shown 
below: 
In  Zi84 - In  483 =  1.3092 (In IN84 - In IN,,)  + 
-  1.0576 [(In  Yi84  - In  YN84) - (In  Yix3 - In  YNx3)] 
(.4637) 
(.4928) 
R2 = .0875, F = 4.61 
where Zi  = percentage of itemizers in  state i or nationally, 
Y,  = per capita income in state i or nationally. 
This estimating equation for state tax prices based on the national 
average price behaves quite differently than Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 
hypothesize for local prices based on the state average. If the difference 
between state and national per capita income decreases over the period, 
itemizing in  that state decreases  (and thus the tax price  increases); 
itemizing in a state apparently goes down as income goes up. Although 
this result suggests caution about Holtz-Eakin and Rosen’s approach, 
there are at least two reasons why the results for the local estimates 
may be different from these results for state itemizing. First, the state 
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that marginal rates will rise (and tax prices fall) as income rises. Second, 
states are such large and diverse areas that the assumption of no change 
in  other factors influencing tax  prices  over the period  may  be  less 
accurate for states than localities. 
State Property Tax Incentives. A second concern about the measure- 
ment of local tax prices arises for two related  reasons. Holtz-Eakin 
and Rosen consider only the incentive created by federal deductibility, 
ignoring state tax incentives from deductions, credits, and grants, and 
as a result they lump together all the deductible taxes on property, 
income, and sales. My  sense is that for many local governments the 
potential revenue tradeoff among these three taxes is both more sig- 
nificant and likely than a tradeoff between these taxes as a group and 
other revenues (nondeductible taxes and charges). But obviously, sub- 
stitution between property taxes on the one hand and a local income 
or sales tax on the other cannot be considered in this framework. It 
does not seem surprising that Holtz-Eakin and Rosen find no effect of 
tax prices on use of  nondeductible  revenues, which are mostly user 
charges. Because of  the administrative costs of  establishing and op- 
erating a user fee system, marginal adjustments of user charge reliance 
are unlikely-either  user charges are used to cover a substantial portion 
of costs or they are not. 
The difficulty from grouping property taxes with income and sales 
taxes is intensified by the fact that specific state government incentives 
influencing property  taxes  are common. Taxpayers  in  33  states are 
allowed an itemized deduction against state income tax for local prop- 
erty taxes, and state government credits for local property taxes are 
provided in 32 states, with both incentives used to some degree in 21 
states. Both of these state tax incentives reduce the marginal price of 
local property taxes. In addition, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen apparently 
(see their footnote 8) restricted their sample to cities with responsibility 
for local education expenditures. In many states, the state aid formula 
for education includes either the property tax rate for education or per 
pupil  property  tax  revenue.  Such a grant formula  also reduces the 
relative tax price for property taxes. 
The available evidence from other studies suggests both that local 
governments do respond significantly to these state property  tax in- 
centives and that localities may respond to all tax incentives differently 
for property, income, and sales taxes. Property tax responses to state 
government property tax credits are examined by  Bell and Bowman 
(1987) for Minnesota cities, and Fisher (1986) for Michigan local gov- 
ernments. Both  report  statistically  significant increases  in property 
taxes as a result of the credits, although the magnitude of the increase 
is  somewhat  smaller than  the  effect  estimated  by  Holtz-Eakin  and 
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Inman’s (1985) study of the revenue and expenditure choices of 41 
large cities is perhaps most comparable to the work by  Holtz-Eakin 
and Rosen. Inman tried to include influences of both federal deducti- 
bility  and  state incentives in  the tax price  measures,  however,  and 
estimated separate equations for the different taxes. And his results 
certainly showed differences in the price elasticities for the major taxes- 
the own-price elasticities for property  and general  sales taxes were 
statistically significant and positive while the price elasticity for income 
taxes  took  the  usual  negative  sign.  These  counterintuitive  results 
prompted an energetic, if not convincing, supply-side explanation. In- 
man also found different responses to different components of the tax 
prices for any given tax. These results (counterintuitive ones and all) 
certainly suggest that local government substitution among deductible 
taxes needs to be considered, and that the possibility of local govern- 
ments responding differently to federal deductibility and state tax in- 
centives might also warrant examination. 
It seems to me that there are at least two possibilities for estimating 
separate burden prices for property taxes and other deductible taxes 
so that Holtz-Eakin and Rosen’s method can be applied to these ques- 
tions of allocation among deductible taxes. First, data about use of 
state tax incentives in various localities are sometimes available from 
the state governments, from which more detailed burden prices can be 
computed. Second, state income tax simulation models, such as those 
developed and used by Feenberg and Rosen (1985), may be able to be 
used to calculate the effects of state income tax deductions and credits 
on marginal property tax prices either for taxpayers at selected income 
levels or perhaps for all  state taxpayers on average. Although Holtz- 
Eakin and Rosen note that these credits and deductions have no mar- 
ginal effect for average income taxpayers with average property taxes 
in their sample, that is not parallel to how tax prices net of deductibility 
were computed, In the latter case, the price is the average of  prices 
for itemizers and nonitemizers  rather than the effect of deductibility 
for an average income taxpayer. 
Modeling Local Government Fiscal Decision Making 
Voter or Bureaucratic Choice? One important theoretical issue for all 
studies of government fiscal choice is whether that choice arises directly 
from voting or as a result of some bureaucratic decision. This distinc- 
tion is common in the intergovernmental grant literature; using Inman’s 
terminology, the usual choice is between the median voter and domi- 
nant party models. In the voting models, an individual voter with spe- 
cific characteristics is decisive, and that voter’s characteristics are used 
to estimate the demand function for the government. In the bureaucratic 
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of the entire community, with an average of community characteristics 
usually used to estimate the expenditure or tax equations. 
Among the recent studies of the effect of tax incentives on expend- 
iture and tax structure choice, only Gramlich (1985) explicitly adopts 
the voting approach, specifically the median voter model.  All  of the 
others, including Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, implicitly or explicitly use 
bureaucratic models and, therefore, measure the tax prices as a weighted 
average of the marginal prices for individuals or groups of individuals 
in the community. But these average marginal burden prices suggest a 
smoothness in the tax price distribution that generally simply does not 
exist. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen note this issue briefly early in their paper, 
but  they  reject the  median voter  alternative as having even greater 
problems. 
This issue deserves careful consideration. In the simple case where 
federal tax deductibility is the only tax incentive, taxpayers obviously 
fall into one of two groups, those who itemize and those who do not. 
If  there is a state tax credit in addition to federal deductibility, there 
are four major groups of  taxpayers-those  who take the federal de- 
duction only (and are not eligible for the credit); those who receive the 
state credit but do not itemize for federal taxes (perhaps because they 
have no mortgage interest to deduct or because they are renters); those 
taxpayers who itemize and receive the state credit; and those who can 
take advantage of neither option. The implication is that there may be 
significant discontinuities in the distribution of tax prices among tax- 
payers in a given community. Can such an environment be adequately 
represented by an average of those prices? 
In a voting model, tax incentives will influence the community choice 
only if the decisive voter’s tax price is reduced by the incentives or if 
the identity of the decisive voter is changed by  the tax incentives. In 
many cities, a majority of taxpayers obviously do not itemize federal 
deductions; indeed, median income taxpayers do not itemize in many 
cities. These observations are at least part of the reason why Gramlich 
finds smaller effects on local government expenditures from changes 
in deductibility than in many other studies. Indeed, Gramlich finds no 
expenditure effect from changes in  deductibility in the two large and 
relatively lower income central cities in his sample, Detroit and Lan- 
sing. This stands in contrast to the relatively large expenditure effects 
reported by  Holtz-Eakin and Rosen  [even after allowing for the dif- 
ference in tax price elasticities measured for an individual as opposed 
to all individuals, as discussed by Feldstein and Metcalf (1986)l. 
Alternative Responses  to Tax  Incentives. Of  course, changes in  de- 
ductibility or other tax incentives may cause changes in tax structure 
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the mix of revenue sources used. By altering their tax structures, state 
or local governments may attempt to offset the distributional changes 
caused by the change in tax incentives. 
As Gramlich and others have pointed out, the main effect of altering 
deductibility  is to change the distribution of  the tax  burden toward 
those who gain most from deductibility.  Because elimination of  de- 
ductibility is expected to increase the progressivity of subnational gov- 
ernment taxes, states and localities may respond not only by changing 
the level of spending or the mix of revenue sources, but also by changing 
the type of services provided or the distribution (progressivity) of their 
tax burden. The last response need not require changes in the mix of 
taxes which is used, but simply changes in tax structure. For instance, 
state governments might adopt a less graduated income tax rate struc- 
ture or alter the sales tax base, while local governments might change 
assessment practices or adopt property  tax credits or exemptions.  I 
am a bit skeptical that an average tax price can adequately reflect those 
potential distributional effects. Median voter models may be no better, 
however, because the distributional changes occur even if  the median 
voter’s tax price is unaffected by deductibility. 
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